An inter partes reexamination against a patent holder may be a good idea when a single reference disclosing all claimed elements is located. However, the Federal Circuit has affirmed a patent holder’s success in convincing the USPTO to view the two embodiments disclosed in the reference separately and find that the claimed invention was not obvious as a result of evidence contrary to combining the embodiments in that reference.

On December 11, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the Federal Circuit”) in Fluor Tec, Corp. v. Kappos, [1] affirmed a Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“the Board”) decision upholding the Examiner’s non-rejection of certain claims [2] of U.S. Patent 6,712,880 (“the ’880 Patent”). [3] Review of the Board’s decision arose from an inter partes reexamination of the ’880 Patent in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office initiated by third party requester Fluor, [4] challenging the issuance of the ’880 Patent to Lummus [5] on grounds of obviousness.

The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s decision[6] that the claimed invention is nonobvious in view of the cited prior art. [7]  Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” [8]

Obviousness is a statutory standard for judging invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), based on whether “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious [to a skilled artisan] at the time the invention was made.”[9]  The Federal Circuit reviews “the Board’s legal conclusions [including obviousness [10]] de novo and its factual determinations for substantial evidence.” [11]  

The ’880 Patent is directed [12]  to cryogenic processes to recover compounds using a two-column separation system including an absorber column and a downstream fractionation column, where the absorber column is operated at a pressure substantially greater than the fractionation column. [13]  The cryogenic process of the ‘880 Patent is utilized to break down and refine raw natural gas for consumer use. In particular, representative claim 1 recites (with emphasis added):

“1. A process for separating a heavy key component from an inlet gas stream containing a mixture of methane, C2 compounds, C3 compounds, and heavier compounds, comprising the following steps:

(a)    at least partially condensing and separating the inlet gas into a first liquid stream and a first vapor stream;

(b)   expanding at least a portion of the first liquid stream, at least a portion of which is then designated as a first fractionation feed stream;

(c)    supplying a fractionation column the first fractionation feed stream and a second fractionation feed stream, the fractionation column produces a fractionation overhead vapor stream and a fractionation bottom stream;

(d)   expanding at least a portion of the first vapor stream, such expanded portion then designated as an expanded vapor stream;

(e)   supplying an absorber the expanded vapor stream and an absorber feed stream, the absorber produces an absorber overhead stream and an absorber bottom stream, the absorber having an absorber pressure that is substantially greater than and at a predetermined differential pressure from a fractionation column pressure; … .” [14]

In inter partes reexamination, Fluor relied on the single reference of International Patent Publication Number WO 02/14763 of Mak (“Mak”) arguing that Mak discloses two gas processing embodiments suitable for the recovery of compounds that include an absorber and a fractionation column where the absorber is operated at a pressure higher than the fractionation column. [15]  The first configuration is a low-pressure feed gas design that does not involve expanding a vapor stream, while the second configuration is a high-pressure feed gas design. [16]  Fluor tried to show that either embodiment could be modified or combined to render the claims of the ’880 Patent obvious on two grounds.

Flour first contended that adding an expander to Mak’s low-pressure configuration (first embodiment) is obvious because, when a skilled artisan merely makes a design choice to utilize a low-pressure system with a high-pressure feed gas, the addition of an expander is necessary to satisfy the well-known need to match the feed gas pressure with the absorber pressure. [17]

The Federal Circuit disagreed with this argument, however, reasoning that Mak’s low-pressure configuration does not include expanding the vapor stream as required by the claims; rather, the vapor stream is fed into an absorber after cooling in heat a exchanger and without passing through an expander. [18] The Federal Circuit further reasoned that Mak specifically includes evidence contrary to combining the expander to Mak’s first embodiment, such as discussing the advantages of the “no turboexpander design” for low-pressure feed gas. The Federal Circuit then reasoned that, rather than modifying the low-pressure system, a skilled artisan would follow the alternative systems disclosed in Mak when desiring to accommodate an expander and a high-pressure feed gas. [19]

The Federal Circuit thus held that the relevant evidence adequately supports “the Board’s factual findings underlying its conclusion that the claims would not have been obvious.” [20]

With respect to Fluor’s second position, Fluor contended that modifying Mak’s high-pressure configuration (second embodiment) is obvious because a skilled artisan would have routed the liquid phase differently depending on the feed gas composition. [21]  For instance, when the feed gas is rich, [22]  rerouting the liquid phase to the fractionation column as claimed, rather than to the absorber column as described in Mak’s high-pressure configuration, is obvious because rerouting provides a more efficient separation in the high-pressure system. [23]

The Federal Circuit disagreed with this contention, reasoning that in Mak’s high-pressure configuration, the liquid stream is fed into and undergoes chemical processing in the absorber, by interaction with a gas stream and a reflux stream, to produce a liquid absorber bottom stream that is subsequently expanded in a Joules-Thompson valve, while the ’880 Patent claims require that the expanded liquid stream be supplied directly to the fractionation column as a first fractionation feed stream without further chemical processing. [24]

The Federal Circuit also reasoned that the ’880 Patent claims are not limited to a rich feed gas (but encompass any hydrocarbon stream), neither the claimed invention nor Mak discloses or suggests that the mixture of hydrocarbons in the feed gas directly weighs on the process choice employed for separation, and Mak emphasizes that the configuration choice should depend on the feed gas pressure, not the composition. [25]

In addition, the Federal Circuit stated the “Fluor has provided no evidence or rationale to support its proposition that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to substantially modify Mak’s high-pressure configuration by rerouting the first liquid stream depending on the composition of the feed gas.” [26]

Thus, Flour’s second position also failed to show obviousness.

Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found Flour’s obviousness contentions unpersuasive because the substantial evidence of:

1) feeding a vapor stream into the absorber without passing through an expander, disclosing the “no turboexpander design” advantages, and presenting an alternative high-pressure system – with regard to the first contention – and

2) Mak’s teachings as a whole, which would not motivate a skilled artisan to modify the high-pressure system by rerouting the liquid stream, and Fluor’s failure to provide rationale for modifying the high-pressure system – with regard to the second contention. [27]

In addition, it should be noted that this outcome may be viewed as a deferential decision by the Federal Circuit, as the combining of distinct embodiments in a singular patent may more often than not be utilized to establish an obviousness rejection.

Regardless of the possible deference issues in Fluor Tec, Corp. v. Kappos, parties in prosecution, reexamination, or litigation should identify whether a reference teaches an embodiment that a skilled artisan would follow instead of modifying an alternative embodiment and further whether the selection of one embodiment over another is rooted in design choice.

For more information, please contact Patrick S. Griffin at psg@raderfishman.com or your attorney(s) at Rader, Fishman & Grauer.

–

[1] Fluor Tec, Corp. v. Kappos, 2012U.S. App. LEXIS 25250 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2012).

[2] The claims at issue were claims 1-9, 11, 13, 25-29, 31, 33, 37-47, 55, 56, and 58.

[3] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 1-2.

[4] Fluor Tec, Corp.

[5] Lummus Technology, Inc.

[6] See Fluor Tec, Corp. v. Patent of Lummus Tech. Inc., No. 2011-013099 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 15, 2011).

[7] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 1-2.

[8] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 8-9 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)).

[9] 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2007).

[10] “Obviousness is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual findings.” Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 8-9; see also In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

[11] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 8-9; see also In re Am. Acad. Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

[12] The Federal Circuit stated that the ’880 Patent was “directed to cryogenic processes for separating multi-component gaseous hydrocarbon streams to recover both gaseous and liquid compounds using a high pressure absorber.” Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 2; see also ’880 Patent, column 1 at lines 10-15.

[13] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 3; see also ’880 patent col.6 ll.52-60.

[14] Representative claim 1 is shown as amended during the reexamination proceeding. Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 2-3.

[15] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 5; also note that the Federal Circuit agreed thatMak disclosed two different configurations for gas separation, which depend on feed gas pressure,Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 5-6.

[16] Id.

[17] In support of this argument, Fluor relied upon on U.S. Patent 4,657,571 issued to Gazzi, which was is not incorporated by reference into the patent specification, was not part of the prosecution history of the reexamination application, was never referenced in arguments to the Examiner or the Board, and was not part of the administrative record considered by the Board; thus, because an appeal is taken on the record before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Gazzi was considered on appeal.Fluor Tec, Corp. v. Kappos, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 9-10 in Footnote 1 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2012).

[18] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 11-12.

[19] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 12-13.

[20] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 10.

[21] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 14-15.

[22] “A lean gas stream is one that contains a higher proportion of lighter hydrocarbons, such as methane (C1) and ethane (C2), and a lower percentage of heavier hydrocarbons, such as propane (C3) and butane (C4). In contrast, a rich gas stream is one that contains a lower proportion of lighter hydrocarbons and a higher proportion of heavier hydrocarbon components.”Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 15 in Footnote 2.

[23] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 14-15.

[24] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 15-16.

[25] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 16.

[26] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 16-17; see alsoKSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, at 418 (requiring “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006))); see also Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (obviousness determination improper where “little more than an invocation of the words ‘common sense’ (without any record support showing that this knowledge would reside in the ordinarily skilled artisan)”).

[27] Fluor, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25250, 16-17.

Within the next few months, ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), the organization that manages the domain name system, will begin to release new top level domains (TLDs), many of which will be generic terms such as .music, .hotel, .blog, and .sucks.

While the majority of new TLDs may be of no interest to your business, registration of domain names for certain TLDs will be important.  For example, another individual may attempt to register yourtrademark.sucks or yourtrademark.feedback. 

So, how do you protect yourself?

ICANN has created the Trademark Clearinghouse, which is a single, central database of authenticated, registered trademarks.  The Trademark Clearinghouse provides trademark owners with (1) priority in applying for registration of domain names corresponding to their trademarks, and (2) gives trademark owners notice of domain name applications made by others during the Trademark Claims period that correspond to the owner’s trademark(s) registered with the Clearinghouse.

Trademark owners may submit applications for registration with the Trademark Clearinghouse directly or through an agent.  If you would like Rader, Fishman & Grauer to register trademarks with the Trademark Clearinghouse on your behalf, the following are included in our services:

Registration of a trademark with the Clearinghouse, including the required supporting documentation and proof of use:

• Notifications to you when additional gTLDs are introduced with information regarding priority domain name registration;
• Notifications when applications are filed for registration of domain names corresponding to your trademarks registered with the Clearinghouse during the Trademark Claims period; and
• Reminders when domain name registrations with the Clearinghouse are due for renewal.

For more information, please contact Michelle Visser at  mlv@raderfishman.com, Melissa Atherton at mra@raderfishman.com or your attorney(s) at Rader, Fishman & Grauer.

A District Court has held that a sufficient pre-suit investigation may require obtaining and analyzing the accused product when information about the accused products is not difficult or costly to obtain.

In Smart Options, LLC, v. Jump Rope, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17743 (E.D. IL 2013), the District Court awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to Rule 11 after granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.

The defendant, Jump Rope, Inc., offers a smart phone application that allows users to bypass lines at events or facilities. While the application is free to download, the user must purchase a “jump” for around $35-$40.  Each “jump” allows the user to move to the front of the line for quick access to the event or facility.

Smart Options accused Jump Rope of infringing U.S. Patent No. 7,313,539. The ‘539 patent describes a system that allows a user to purchase an option to obtain goods or services in the future.  According to the District Court’s interpretation, the claims of the ‘539 patent require two purchases—one to reserve the option and another at the time the option is executed.  

In awarding sanctions, the District Court found that a simple investigation—downloading Jump Rope’s app and purchasing a “jump” (for about $40)—would have shown that Jump Rope’s app does not infringe the ‘539 patent.  Having failed to take these steps, even after Jump Rope served its Rule 11 motion, Smart Options was forced to pay Jump Ropes’ attorneys’ fees.  Specifically, the District Court criticized Smart Options’ counsel for omitting screenshots of the app, statements detailing any use of the app, statements showing how purchases are made through the app, and other measures of investigation.

Acknowledging that obtaining the allegedly infringing product is not always necessary, the District Court’s holding suggests that the ease of obtaining information about the accused product is an important factor to be considered when awarding sanctions.  In the instant case, Smart Options’ counsel should have downloaded the free app and purchased a “jump.”  Had it done so, according to the District Court, Smart Options’ counsel would have recognized prior to filing the lawsuit that its technical understanding of the allegedly infringing app was incomplete.

For more information, please contact Stephen J. Kontos at sjk@raderfishman.com or your attorney(s) at Rader, Fishman & Grauer.

In settlement agreements and lawsuits, covenants not to sue are relatively common, though not all of them divest courts of Article III jurisdiction. Thus, the question is: how broad does a covenant not to sue need to be in order to divest the courts of Article III jurisdiction? Already v. Nike instructs that the key consideration is whether a genuine threat of enforcement persists. In determining this, the courts will evaluate how broad the covenant is, whether it is unconditional and irrevocable, and whether the court and parties can fathom a situation falling outside such covenant. [1] Therefore, if drafting a covenant not to sue with the intent to divest the court of its jurisdiction, lawyers should make the covenant so broad that the threat of future enforcement is practically non-existent.

The Air Force 1 Advantage: Divesting courts of Article III jurisdiction.

In Nike v. Already, LLC., the Supreme Court of the United States determined that a plaintiff’s covenant not to sue can divest a court of jurisdiction to hear a defendant’s invalidity counterclaim. [2]

Nike, Inc. (“Nike”) sued Already, LLC (“Already”) for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and trademark dilution of its trade dress used in connection with Nike’s Air Force 1 shoe. In response, Already filed counterclaims seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating Nike’s trademark registration, and cancellation of the registration.

After a re-evaluation of its enforcement strategy, Nike delivered a broad covenant not to sue to Already. Subsequently, Nike moved to dismiss its infringement claims with prejudice and Already’s counterclaims without prejudice on the bases that the covenant not to sue rendered the claims moot.

Already opposed the dismissal of its counterclaims. The Southern District of New York found that no case or controversy existed and dismissed Nike and Already’s claims. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of the United States affirmed.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling

Article III of the Constitution grants the judicial branch of the government the authority to adjudicate cases and controversies. Courts may adjudicate cases and controversies when a litigant shows injury from a defendant’s conduct. [3]

A controversy no longer exists, or the case becomes moot, when a case or controversy ceases to exist. [4] Pursuant to the voluntary cessation doctrine, a defendant may moot a controversy by showing that it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. [5]

In a successful attempt to meet this burden, Nike granted Already a covenant not to sue. Nike’s covenant not to sue stated, in relevant part, that Nike shall:

“refrain from making any claims or demands, or from commencing, causing, or permitting to be prosecuted any action in law or equity against [Already] or any of its successors or related entities and their customers, on account of any possible cause of action based on or involving trademark infringement, unfair competition, or dilution, under state or federal law in the United States relating to the NIKE Mark based on the appearance of any of [Already]’s current and/or previous footwear product designs, and any colorable imitations thereof, regardless of whether the footwear is produced, distributed, offered for sale, advertised, sold, or otherwise used in commerce…” [6]

The Court determined that Nike’s covenant satisfied the burden imposed by the voluntary cessation doctrine because the threat of Nike’s further enforcement of its trademarks was minimal since its covenant not to sue was unconditional, irrevocable, prevented Nike from making any claim or demand against Already, protected Already’s distributors and customers, and applied to past, present, and future products. [7] Further, the Court found in favor of Nike because Already failed to provide evidence of an intent to design or market shoes falling outside the scope of the covenant, nor could the Court conjure a scenario that would fall outside the scope of the covenant subjecting Already to subsequent trademark infringement liability. [8]

The Demise of Trademark Rights: the consequences of a broad covenant not to sue on trademark rights.

Prior to drafting a broad covenant not to sue, the consequences such a covenant may have on one’s trademark rights should be considered. Specifically, if a trademark holder issues several covenants not to sue with reference to the same trademark, the trademark owner may not be perceived as a source indicator, meaning the value of its trademark could be lost.

Likewise, a broad covenant not to sue may also be comparable to an unlimited and uncontrolled license (i.e. a “naked license”). Such license can also result in loss of trademark rights because a licensor has no control over the quality of the goods or services sold in connection with its mark.

Thus, in considering whether to execute a covenant not to sue, lawyers must weigh the risks and benefits. Practitioners should also evaluate the strength of the mark at issue and determine whether the mark could sustain an invalidity challenge. Further, attorneys should consider whether a covenant not to sue will ultimately impact consumers’ perception of the trademark at issue. [9]  If it is unlikely that consumer perception will be altered by third-party uses of similar trademarks, then a covenant not to sue may be an effective offensive strategy to avoid an invalidity challenge of a trademark.

For more information, please contact Melissa R. Atherton at mra@raderfishman.com or your attorney(s) at Rader, Fishman & Grauer .

[2] Already, LLC, v. Nike Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).

[3] Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

[4] Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982).

[5]  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982).

[6]Already, LLC, v. Nike Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 728.

[7] Id. at 732.

[8] Id.

[9]  Tal S. Benschar, David Kalow, & Milton Springut, Covenant Not To Sue: A Super Sack Or Just A Wet Paper Bag?,102 TMR 1213, 1229 (2012).

Thirty of Michigan’s top attorneys have been chosen for Michigan Lawyers Weekly’s Leaders in the Law, Class of 2013.  Leaders were selected from numerous nominations from around the state in all areas of law, and included small and large law firm lawyers, politicians, judges and those in public service.

Kristin Murphy is a managing partner at Rader, Fishman & Grauer. Her practice encompasses domestic and foreign patent prosecution, patent opinion work, domestic trademark prosecution, trade secret counseling, intellectual property valuations/due diligence and drafting and negotiation agreements relating to technology and intellectual property.  Murphy is the current president of the WBA – Oakland County Region of WLAM.  She is also the first vice-president of the Michigan Intellectual Property Law Association (MIPLA), a former co-chair of the Industrial Advisory Council for the School of Engineering at Western New England University, and serves on the Board of Directors for The Pink Fund; a Michigan-based charity that provides short-term financial aid to women and men who are in active treatment for and recovery from breast cancer.  Contact Kristin Murphy.

Michigan Lawyers Weekly will hold an awards luncheon on March 21 at the Detroit Marriott in Troy, where one of the 30 honorees will be named 2013 Lawyer of the Year.

According to Cristina Huson, ExecSense VP of Speaker Relations, “The insight Ms. Murphy provided was unique and enlightening and I’m sure executives across the globe will find it to be of great value.” ExecSense works with leading executives who provide unique insight into their roles and industries.

Kristin Murphy is a managing partner at Rader, Fishman & Grauer. Her practice encompasses domestic and foreign patent prosecution, patent opinion work, domestic trademark prosecution, trade secret counseling, intellectual property valuations/due diligence and drafting and negotiation agreements relating to technology and intellectual property. She also has extensive experience with trademark, unfair competition, antitrust and patent litigation, at the District property law firm Court level and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Contact Kristin Murphy.

About Rader, Fishman & Grauer:
Rader, Fishman & Grauer, a leading intellectual property law firm, has ranked in the top 10 percent of law firms in number of new patents and trademarks filed (IP Today). The firm, is also a leader in intellectual property litigation, focuses exclusively on patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and licensing for companies worldwide. Offices are in Bloomfield Hills, MI; Washington, D.C.; Silicon Valley, CA, Orange County, CA and Tokyo, Japan. For more information, go to www.raderfishman.com

About ExecSense:
ExecSense is the world’s largest publisher of professional webinars, eBooks, eDocuments and podcasts, producing 1,000+ new programs every year and replaying thousands of others from their vast library of digital thought leadership. ExecSense enables executives to be in-the-know on the most important skills, new best practices, hot topics, and technologies that impact their specific profession, in a schedule-friendly format that is easily viewable on their computer, mobile phone, iPod, iPad, Kindle, and 22 other types of devices. ExecSense webinars have been attended by C-Level executives in over 34 countries, partners at more than 90% of the largest 200 law firms, and C-Level executives from companies such as Johnson & Johnson, Oracle, Siemens, Amazon.com, Accenture, HP, Kraft, UPS, Nike, Mayo Clinic, Wells Fargo, Visa, Humana, Whole Foods, Intel, Standard & Poors, Kaiser Permanente, Pepsico and thousands of other leading companies.

Bloomfield Hills, Mich., November 29, 2012 — Michael D. Fishman of Rader, Fishman & Grauer, PLLC, a leading intellectual property firm representing companies worldwide, has been designated 2013 “Lawyer of the Year” by Best Lawyers in America in the field of Trademark Law for the Detroit area.

Best Lawyers in America designates only one lawyer in each practice area, in a designated metropolitan area, as “Lawyer of the Year.” Lawyers honored as “Lawyer of the Year” are selected based on peer reviews conducted among thousands of lawyers each year.  Receiving this designation reflects the respect a lawyer has earned among other lawyers for his/her abilities, professionalism and integrity. Best Lawyers in America is the oldest and most respected peer-review publication in the legal profession.

Fishman, a founding member of Rader, Fishman & Grauer, has filed, prosecuted and maintained thousands of trademark applications and registrations in more than 200 jurisdictions worldwide.  His experience spans numerous industries, including banking, insurance, automotive, packaged foods, furniture, publishing, sports, entertainment, building, computer hardware/software, telecommunications, food service and medical and laboratory products. Fishman advises companies on trademark protection, enforcement, international brand strategy and brand expansion, licensing and ownership. He is the recipient of numerous accolades and awards.  He holds a Juris Doctorate from Wayne State University. Contact Michael Fishman.

Rader, Fishman & Grauer, a leading intellectual property law firm, has ranked in the top 10 percent of law firms in number of new patents and trademarks filed (IP Today).  The firm, also a leader in intellectual property litigation, focuses exclusively on patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and licensing for companies worldwide. Offices are in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan; Washington, D.C.; and Tokyo, Japan. For more information, go to www.raderfishman.com.

Bloomfield Hills Mich., November  14, 2012 –Attorneys R. Terrance Rader, Michael D. Fishman, Glenn E. Forbis, Kristin L. Murphy and Michael B. Stewart of Rader, Fishman & Grauer PLLC, were named Michigan Super Lawyers for 2012.  Rader Fishman & Grauer is a leading intellectual property firm representing companies around the globe. 

No more than 5 percent of Michigan lawyers are recognized as Super Lawyers, a rating that’s based on a statewide lawyer survey, an independent research evaluation of candidates and peer reviews representing more than 70 practice areas.  Super Lawyers is a business of Thomson Reuters.  For more information, go to superlawyers.com. 

All of the Rader, Fishman & Grauer attorneys named Michigan Super Lawyers have been recognized on the list before.

Rader has repeatedly been named a Super Lawyer.  He has been  trial counsel in more than 400 federal intellectual property lawsuits, and has obtained numerous multi-million-dollar verdicts or settlements for plaintiffs and defendants.  Rader has litigated on behalf of a number of high-profile celebrity clients including the rock group KISS and singer Aretha Franklin.  He holds a Juris Doctor from American University.  Contact Terrance Rader. 

Fishman has held the Super Lawyers designation since the list’s inception in 2006.  He has managed the filing, prosecution and maintenance of thousands of trademark applications and registrations in more than 200 jurisdictions worldwide.  Fishman holds a Juris Doctor from Wayne State University.  Contact Michael Fishman.

Forbis has also held the Super Lawyers designation since the list’s inception in 2006.  He litigates patent and trademark disputes in federal court around the U.S., and advises companies on managing and expanding their domestic and foreign patent portfolios.  Forbis holds a Juris Doctor, Master of Business Administration and Bachelor of Science from University of Michigan.  Contact Glenn Forbis 

Murphy has also been named a Super Lawyer multiple times.  She prosecutes domestic and foreign patents and domestic trademarks, and counsels companies on trade secrets, intellectual property valuations and agreements and unfair competition. Murphy is president of the Oakland County region of the Women Lawyers Association of Michigan and is first vice president of the Michigan Intellectual Property Law Association.  Murphy holds a Juris Doctor and Master of Intellectual Property from Franklin Pierce Law Center (now known as the University of New Hampshire School of Law).  Contact Kristin Murphy. 

Stewart has also been named a Super Lawyer multiple times.  He prosecutes domestic and foreign patents and trademarks in a wide variety of disciplines including IT, e-commerce, telecommunications, aerospace and nuclear engineering.  He also advises companies on managing large global intellectual property portfolios.  Stewart holds a Juris Doctor fromUniversity of Michigan.  Contact Michael Stewart.

Rader, Fishman & Grauer, a leading intellectual property law firm, ranked in the top 10 percent of law firms in the number of new patents and trademarks filed (IP Today).  The firm, also a leader in intellectual property litigation, focuses exclusively on patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and licensing for companies worldwide. Offices are in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan; Washington, D.C.; and Tokyo, Japan. For more information, go to raderfishman.com.